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VIABILITY OF THE ANTITRUST PER SE
ILLEGALITY RULE: SCHWINN DOWN,
HOW MANY TO GO?
WILLIAM S. STEWART*
BARRY S. ROBERTS**
Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,1 which overruled United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Co.,' prompted an avalanche of legal
commentaries,' a fact in itself suggestive of a landmark case. One lead-
ing author characterized the case as a "watershed decision which
should greatly influence future developments in the antitrust field."4
Numerous commentators openly question whether the decision will
lead to the demise of other per se rules5 of illegality. Will the applica-
* Professor, University of North Carolina, Graduate School of Business Administration.
B.S., Georgia Institute of Technology; LL.B., Harvard University.
** Associate Professor of Legal Studies, University of North Carolina Graduate School of
Business Administration. B.A., 1970, Pennsylvania State University; J.D., 1973, University of
Pennsylvania School of Law; LL.M., 1976, Harvard University.
1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See notes 12-25 infra and accompanying text.
3. Bork, VerticalRestraints.: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 171; Handler, Changing
Trends in Antitrust Doctrines. An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
979 (1977); Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978); Posner, The Rule a/Reason and the Economic Approack" Reflections on
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977); Weisberg, Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania
Implicationsfor Horizontal as Well as Vertical, Restraints on Distributors, 33 Bus. LAW. 1757
(1978); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 231 (1977); Note, Antitrust-Vertical
Restrictions-Rule of Reason, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1240 (1977).
4. Handler, supra note 3, at 980. Professor Bork has stated that the new Sylvania approach
"is capable of altering the entire corpus of antitrust jurisprudence, which now stands in considera-
ble need of repair." Bork, supra note 3, at 172.
5. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits restraints of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
See note 17 infra. If interpreted literally every contract would be illegal; hence, the test formu-
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tion of the rule of reason test 6 to vertical nonprice restraints affect the
established per se approach to tying arrangements,7 horizontal territo-
rial restrictions,8 horizontal price-fixing, 9 resale price maintenance,' 0
and concerted refusals to deal?" Will Sylvania turn antitrust law
lated is one based on the reasonableness of the restraint. See National Soe'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918).
Certain categories of restraints, however, are deemed unreasonable by their very nature and
thus are per se illegal. There "are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study ... is needed to establish their illegality-they are 'illegal
per se.'" National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. at 692. In the oft-
quoted words of Mr. Justice Black:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreason-
able and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle ofperse unreasonableness not
only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain
to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a partic-
ular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when under-
taken.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
6. The rule of reason is the prevailing standard of section 1 of the Sherman Act. See 433
U.S. at 49. But see Posner, supra note 3, at 14. The standard is generally defined by the oft-
quoted words of Mr. Justice Brandeis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or proba-
ble. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the re-
verse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to pre-
dict consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), quotedin 433 U.S. at 49 n.15.
Both Pitofsky and Posner, however, state that this test presents no guidance for the lower courts,
See generally Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 11; Posner, supra note 3, at 13-16; ABA Antitrust Section,
Monograph No. 2, VerticalRestrictions Limiting Intrabrand Competition 53-71 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Monograph No. 2].
7. See generally Posner, supra note 3, at 11-12.
8. See notes 77-108 infra and accompanying text. For purposes of this Article the term
territorial allocation or restrictions will encompass customer allocation or restrictions unless other-
wise specified.
9. This issue is beyond the scope of this Article; however, it does appear that such restraints
shall properly remain per se illegal.
10. See notes 45-76, 109-28 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 129-57 infra and accompanying text.
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"topsy turvy"?
This Article explores these significant questions four years after the
momentous Sylvania decision. The impact of Sylvania on various anti-
trust restraints is first examined in a descriptive fashion. Then, a prin-
cipled approach for dealing generally with this type of econo-legal
problem is suggested.
I. THE INEVITABILITY OF SYLVANIA
The extremely harsh treatment accorded United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co. '2 by both courts' 3 and commentators14 presaged a Syl-
vania-type decision but not one of its breadth. 5 The Schwinn Court' 6
found a per se violation of the antitrust laws'7 when a manufacturer 8
12. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Wilson v. I.B.E. Indus., Inc., 510 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1975); Adolph Coors Co. v.
FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847
n.13 (3d Cir. 1974); Good Investment Promotions, Inc. v. Coming Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891, 893
(6th Cir. 1974); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637, 639, 642 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied. 411 U.S. 987 (1973). See generally Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 275-76 (1975) (calling GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537
F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), "aberrational" in following the Schwinn ruling). See also Tripoli Co. v.
Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936 (3d Cir.) (distinguishing Schwinn on its facts), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 831(1970); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Perfumes, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968).
14. See. e.g.. M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 731, 1056 (1973) ("In my
view, the most egregious error in all of antitrust was that committed by Justice Fortas in
Schwinn."); Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44
ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975); Pollock, Antitrust Problems in Franchising, 15 N.Y.L.F. 106, 110-13
(1969); Posner, Anitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283-99 (1975);
Robinson, supra note 13, at 270 ("Perhaps no decision in the annals of antitrust has evoked more
criticism."); The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 235-39 (1967); Note, Territorial
Restrictions and Per Se Rules-Re-evaluation of the Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 616 (1972).
15. Professor Robinson, noting that the two imposed restrictions were clearly distinguishable,
stated that the Sylvania decision was not preordained by Schwinn. Robinson, supra note 13, at
277-78. See also 433 U.S. at 59-65 (White, J., concurring); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental
T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 989-1000 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
16. The decision in which Justices Warren, Brennan, Black, and Douglas joined was authored
by Mr. Justice Fortas. Mr. Justices Stewart and Harlan dissented. Mr. Justices Clark and White
did not participate in the decision.
17. Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides in part: "Every
contract, combination, in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal."
18. For purposes of simplification, this Article employs a two tier distribution system: Manu-
facturer/supplier and dealer/distributor.
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retained control or authority over its product after it sold the good.
The Schwinn Court rested its decision in part on the ancient rule
against restraints on alienation."z The Court made a fanciful distinc-
tion between the sale of a product and the distribution of the same
good through a consignment or agency relationship.2' Thus, if a manu-
facturer parts with dominion over its goods, the imposition of a territo-
rial or customer restriction on its purchasers is a per se violation.22
When title, dominion, and risk are retained, however, a court will in-
spect the manufacturer's restrictions under a rule of reason analysis.2 3
Perhaps the confusion stemming from the harsh treatment accorded
the Schwinn decision derived partly from the unexpectedness of the de-
cision. The government did not proffer a per se illegality standard,2 4
either at trial or on appeal, but merely supported a presumptive illegal-
ity standard.25 Four years earlier the Court in White Motor Co. v.
United States26 rejected per se illegality of nonprice vertical restrictions
until an adverse economic and business impact of the practice could be
demonstrated. Until that time the Court felt it premature to express a
"view one way or the other on the legality of such an arrangement. 2 7
Nor did White Motor, contrary to some beliefs,2  adopt a rule of reason
19. Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek
to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the
manufacturer has parted with dominion. . . . If the manufacturer parts with dominion
over his product or transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control over its
destiny or the conditions of its resale.
388 U.S. at 379.
20. This rationale has been criticized as being "a mischievous precedent which rested on a
nonexistent principle of ancient property law and which was historically incorrect." Handler,
supra note 3, at 980-81. See also M. HANDLER, supra note 14, at 1056; Posner, supra note 14, at
295-96; Robinson, supra note 13, at 270-71.
21. When the manufacturer retains title, dominion, and risk over the product through an
agency or consignment relationship, the appropriate test is one of reasonableness. 388 U.S. at 380.
22. See note 19 supra. Note that the Court spoke in terms of restriction on "areas or per-
sons." 388 U.S. at 379. /
23. See note 21 supra.
24. See Posner, supra note 3, at 2-3. Note that Professor Posner was the government attorney
who both briefed and argued the case and who has since taken "a 180-degree turn." Id. at 2.
25. Id. at 2-3. See also Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 51 n.196.
26. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Interestingly, Mr. Justice Clark, who dissented in hIlte Motor, was
the designated trial judge in Sylvania.
27. Id. at 261. The government first adopted the position that such restraints were per se
illegal in 1949. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 143 (1977); Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 6.
28. See, e.g., In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577 F.2d 910, 915 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 685, 686
[Vol. 58:727
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standard.29 The White Motor Court adopted no standard at all.
In overruling Schwinn, Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in
Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,3 ° extended the Schwinn
decision to its furthest possible breadth3 by equating Sylvania's loca-
tion clause 32 in both "intent and competitive impact" 33 with Schwinn's
(W.D. Pa. 1977); Note, Vertical Restraints and the Demise of Schwinn: Sylvania and the Rule of
Reason. 42 ALB. L. REv. 137, 146 (1977).
29. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text. The courts never had an opportunity to
reconsider the case because it was settled under a consent decree prior to the retrial. 11964] (CCH)
Trade Cas. 71,195 (N.D. Ohio).
30. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In Sylvania the manufacturer, GTE Sylvania, Inc., had a distribution
system whereby it sold its televisions to both uncontrolled and company controlled middlemen,
who in turn resold the televisions to independent retailers. When Sylvania's market share de-
clined in 1962 to between one and two percent of the national market, the company decided to
limit its number of retail franchises to attract higher quality and more aggressive retailers. It
therefore required authorized retailers to sell Sylvania products only at their approved and
franchised locations. These locations were not exclusive areas of distribution; Sylvania reserved
the right to determine the number of retailers in any area.
Controversy arose when Sylvania decided to franchise Young Brothers, a San Francisco retailer
of televisions, even though Continental T.V., an established Sylvania retailer, was located only
one mile away. Continental complained that franchising Young Brothers was not consistent with
Sylvania's marketing policy. When Sylvania ignored Continental, Continental cancelled their
outstanding Sylvania order and placed an order with Phillips, another television manufacturer.
Continental then requested that they be allowed to start a new franchise in Sacramento. Sylva-
nia denied the request on the ground that no new franchise was needed in Sacramento. Neverthe-
less. Continental leased a store in Sacramento and began stocking it with Sylvania products.
Sylvania then reduced Continental's authorized credit from $300,000 to $50,000, "allegedly for
unrelated reasons." Id. at 39. Continental refused to pay its debts to John P. Maquire Co., Inc.,
the finance company handling Sylvania's accounts. Sylvania then disenfranchised Continental.
Continental brought this action alleging that Sylvania's newly established distribution system was
a per se illegal territorial allocation under the Schwinn doctrine. Id. at 38-42.
31. The Court interpreted the Schwinn holding as declaring per se illegal all territorial and
customer restrictions without regard to possible differences between airtight restrictions and less
severe restrictions such as location clauses, areas of primary responsibility clauses, and profit pass-
over clauses. 433 U.S. at 45. But see Id. at 59 (White, J., concurring); Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 8-
9.
At this point it would be beneficial to define the above-named less restrictive clauses:
(a) Location clauses--establish the site at which the distributor may sell or manufac-
ture (in the case of a licensee) the specified goods;
(b) areas of primary responsibility--establish areas in which the distributor must make
its best efforts to distribute the goods and often will be prevented from selling
outside of its area;
(c) profit pass-over-establish that a dealer making a sale outside of its assigned terri-
tory must compensate the distributor in whose area the sale was consumated,
See Monograph No. 2. supra note 6, at 3, 4; Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 4.
32. See note 31 supra.
33. 433 U.S. at 46.
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airtight territorial and customer restrictions.34 Powell then addressed
whether Schwinn should be abrogated or followed .3  The Court, how-
ever, foreclosed itself from distinguishing the Schwinn decision on the
basis of differences in the anticompetitive nature of the two different
restrictions.36
After summarily dismissing the sale-no sale dichotomy37 the Court
determined that a rule of reason analysis should be followed because
"there has been no showing . . . that vertical restrictions have or are
likely to have a 'pernicious effect on competition' or that they 'lack any
redeeming virtue.' ,38 Significantly, the Court ruled that any "depar-
ture from the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstra-
ble economic effect." 39 A determination must be made whether the
restriction is supported by economic utility, i e., redeeming virtue.4
In holding that the vertical restraints imposed by Sylvania were eco-
nomically efficient and therefore justified, the Court paid particular at-
tention to the economic analysis of Professors Bork and Posner.41
In support of vertical nonpri-e-restraints, the Court recognized the
following justifications: (1) The attraction of aggressive and competent
distributors to new manufacturers and entrants into the market;42 (2)
the promotion of point-of-sale services and the avoidance of the "free-
rider" problem;43 and (3) the promotion of safe and quality products.44
34. Id. An airtight territorial restriction prohibits a distributor from selling to anybody
outside of its assigned territory, and an airtight customer restriction prevents a distributor from
selling to other customers. See Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 4 n.10.
35. The Court decimated the Schwinn distinction between sales and consignment transac-
tions in holding that the two had the same effect on competition. 433 U.S. at 52-57. Moreover, the
Sylvania opinion was not a reincarnation of the White Motor case, which simply refused to deter-
mine prior to a complete trial the appropriate standard. It is clear that Sylvania elected to follow
the rule of reason approach. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
36. See notes 30-35 infra and accompanying text.
37. 433 U.S. at 57. Not even the standard opponent of vertical territorial restraints could
support this distinction. See generally Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions.-
W~hite Motor and its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1422 (1968).
38. 433 U.S. at 58 (elucidating the per se test). See note 5 supra.
39. 433 U.S. at 58-59.
40. It has been contended that Sylvania was a one-sided decision in thatit only focused on
the redeeming virtue side of the balance and ignored the harmful effects of the restraint. See
Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 8-9; The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. Rv, 70, 237 (1977).
But see Bork, supra note 3, at 172, 186, who contends that the pre-Sylvania Court only looked to
the anticompetitive side of the balance.
41. 433 U.S. at 55-56.
42. Id. at 55.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 55 n.23.
[Vol. 58:727
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/1
ANTITRUST PER SE RULE
The Court's rationale jeopardizes several of its earlier holdings apply-
ing the per se illegality doctrine. This Article now focuses on this as-
pect of the Sylvania decision.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE SYLVANIA RULING ON
OTHER PER SE CATEGORIES
A. Resale Price Maintenance
Mr. Justice White in his concurring opinion in Sylvania ably dis-
closed the majority's internal inconsistency in relying on the purely ec-
onomic approach of Professors Bork and Posner with respect to
exclusive territories and also reaffirmed the per se illegality of vertical
price restraints.4 Both Professors strongly insist that "any argument
that can be made on behalf of exclusive [vertical] territories can
[equally] be made on behalf of resale price maintenance."46 Recogniz-
ing this difference of opinion, the majority stated that "[tihe per se ille-
gality of price restriction has been established firmly for many years
and involves significantly different questions of analysis and policy."47
These two categories of restraints, according to the Court, are clearly
distinguishable. First, "unlike nonprice restrictions, 'resale price' main-
tenance is not designed to, but almost invariably does in fact, reduce
price competition not only among sellers of the affected product but
quite as much between that product and competing brands. 48 Second,
resale price maintenance, unlike territorial allocation, may assist hori-
zontal cartelization. Third, Congress repealed the fair trade laws.49
Both Professors Bork and Posner immediately attacked these "signif-
icant differences."5 The Court, according to Professor Bork, failed to
comprehend the unitary character of vertical restraints and wrongfully
45. See id at 51 n.18; id. at 69 n.10 (White, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 69 n. 10 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Posner, supra note 14, at 293-97). See also
Bork. supra note 3. at 173; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Dirision (part II). 75 YALE L.J. 373, 391-464 (1966).
47. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
48. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Justice Brennan's concurring opinion). Interestingly,
the Court quoted Professor Posner in support of this proposition without including Professor Pos-
ner's rebuttal to this assertion. "There is no excuse ... for distinguishing between price fixing
and market division ...." Posner, supra note 14, at 297.
49. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
50. Bork, supra note 3; Posner, supra note 3.
Number 4]
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differentiated indistinguishable business practices." The legal doctrine
that the Court established fails to conform to economic reality. "[I]t
draws lines and makes distinctions that do not exist in the world it pur-
ports to describe and control. ' 52 It totally ignores microeconomic the-
ory. 53 Therefore, Bork concludes that the two economic justifications
espoused by the Court are easily disposed of as insignificant5 4 and that
the legislative rationale is a mere congressional misunderstanding that
is not written into law. 5
Professor Posner combines the economic rationales into one: resale
price maintenance is utilized to facilitate manufacturer cartelization
and thereby decreases interbrand competition. 6 He dismisses this ra-
tionale, however, as being unsupportable. He argues that no distinc-
tion exists between the possible roles of price and nonprice vertical
restrictions in assisting manufacturer collusion,57 even though the ma-
jority quoted Professor Posner in its attempt to establish such a distinc-
tion.
Lower courts were confronted with the problem of whether to adopt
the reasoning of Sylvania or to follow its literal language when judging
the validity of vertical price restrictions. The First Circuit in Eastern
Scientoc Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc.58 elucidated an ex-
tremely interesting and unique approach. Judge Coffin reasoned in
Eastern Scientoc that a resale price restriction imposed to enforce a
territorial limitation could obviously have no greater anticompetitive
effect than an absolute territorial restriction and thus was not a per se
violation of the antitrust laws.59 The restriction confronting the court
was a prohibition by the manufacturer on its distributors against selling
51. Bork, supra note 3, at 171, 173.
52. Id. at 173.
53. I1d,
54. Id. at 190. Moreover, he significantly concludes that all vertically imposed restrictions
should be considered valid. Id. at 180-81; Bork, supra note 44, at 397. But see Comanor, supra
note 37, who suggests that all vertical territorial restrictions should be per se illegal.
55. Bork, supra note 3, at 190. But see Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 27.
56. Posner, supra note 3, at 708. Professor Posner is incorrect in so doing, however, because
they are two distinct, although at times, interrelated reasons. The first reason, note 46 supra and
accompanying text, extends to the situation in which a competitor, whose price is fixed by a manu-
facturer, not only cannot compete on price with intrabrand products, but also is prevented from
adjusting its price to reflect interbrand competition.
57. Posner, supra note 3, at 7-8.
58. 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
59. Id. at 885-86. See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 226, 231 n.7 (N.D. Cal.
1979).
[Vol. 58:727
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its product below list price outside of the distributors' assigned terri-
tory. The distributors were free to establish the price within their area
of primary responsibility.60 In circumflexing the Sylvania-reinforced
ban against vertical price-fixing, the court refused to characterize such
a restriction as "the kind that require[s] per se treatment."'"
The court reasoned that the entire thrust of Sylvania was to avoid
formalistic line drawing and to rely on sound economic analysis.62 It
believed that any other ruling would place form over substance:
Certainly, if the price at which Heerbrugg [the manufacturer] instruments
would be competitive outside of Rhode Island is less than list price, re-
quiring Eastern [the distributor] to sell at list does no more nor less than
prohibit Eastern from selling outside of Rhode Island altogether. In the
unlikely event that Heerbrugg instruments are competitive at list prices or
at higher than list prices, requiring Eastern to sell at list will have less of
an anti-competitive effect than restricting its sale to Rhode Island regard-
less of price. Thus the resale price restriction in the present case produces
the same anti-competitive effect as pure territorial restrictions but to a
lesser degree. If the Supreme Court holds that pure territorial restrictions
should be analyzed under the rule of reason, we can see no reason based
on substantive economic effect why a similar but less anti-competitive
scheme should be treated differently.63
This was logic that the Supreme Court would have extreme difficulty
circumventing and that, in fact, they elected not to confront.'
The Fifth Circuit in In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation similarly es-
chewed application of the per se test to an alleged price-fixing case.
The court refused to characterize the restraint as a price-fixing agree-
ment.65 Once again a court seemingly struggles to avoid the inflexibil-
ity of the per se doctrine.66 The word "seemingly" is employed in the
60. 572 F.2d at 884.
61. Id. at 885. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
62. 572 F.2d at 885.
63. Id. at 885-86.
64. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 2, 1978. 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
65. In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072
(1979).
66. Nissan concerned an action by a Datsun automobile purchaser against the manufacturer
and its American distribution branch for allegedly conspiring to fix prices through a dealer co-
operative advertising program. Nissan-USA, under the program, would reimburse its dealers for
any advertisement provided it did not list any price other than its suggested retail price and that it
did not compare itself to another dealer. The funds used to pay for the approved advertisements
were obtained by charging each dealer a set sum, based on the suggested retail price on each car it
Number 4]
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previous sentence because of the near utter confusion presented by the
Nissan opinion. The court either had extreme difficulty in interpreting
Sylvania and its predecessors or was simply undiscerning in its choice
of words. For instance, the court indicated that Sylvania represented a
return "to the rule of reason that had governed vertical restriction prior
to United States v. Schwinn"-a clearly incorrect appraisal of the hold-
ing in White Motor.67
Moreover, the Nissan court concluded that Sylvania mandated that
any "departure from the rule of reason standard [in vertical restraint
cases] must be based upon demonstrable economic effect." 68 Did the
court simply make a careless overstatement,69 misread Sylvania, or
elect to apply Sylvania's underlying principles (ie., extend the Posner
and Bork rationale to all vertical restraints including price-fixing)?
sold, which sum was then matched by Nissan. A dealer, nevertheless, was free to sell at any
price-although the plaintiff contended that the above-described program severely limited one's
ability to compete on price.
The court initially distinguished this situation from those presented in United States v. Scaly,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), and United States v. Serta Assocs., 296 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. IUl. 1968),
aft'd, 393 U.S. 534 (1969) (both horizontal restraint decisions) on the ground that it found the
restriction to be vertical in nature. The court proceeded to refuse to characterize the agreement as
a price restraint and therefore upheld the lower court's Sylania type rule of reason analysis to the
questioned restriction, which the jury found to be reasonable.
Looking at the provisions of the co-operative advertising plan, imposed by the manufac-
turer upon all of its franchises, we cannot say as a matter of law that the plan, in the
absence of an agreement to fix prices, was on its face of such an anticompetitive nature
and effect that it negated the rule generally applied in the appraisal of vertical restraint
cases.
577 F.2d at 916. Based on the evidence disclosed, it is certainly arguable that the court appropri-
ately refused to characterize the restriction as a price-fixing agreement. See Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918). But see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Serta Assocs., 296 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. IUl. 1968), aftd, 393 U.S. 534 (1969).
67. As already indicated the law prior to Schwinn was in doubt because the Court in While
Motor refused the opportunity to enunciate the proper standard until it had greater experience
examining the questioned restraint. See notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text. See generally
Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 6-8. It had no support for its position. See also Sandura Co. v.
FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On-Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
For a Note making the same mistake, see Note, Vertical Restraints and the Demise of Schwinn,
supra note 28, at 146.
68. 577 F.2d at 915 (quoting 433 U.S. at 58-59) (emphasis added). Significantly, note that the
underscored parenthetical portion of this quotation was inserted in the statement by the court of
appeals.
69. The court may have been limiting its definition of vertical restraints to nonprice restric-
tions. In defining "vertical restraints," however, the court stated that they are "those limitations
imposed by a manufacturer on his own dealers ... which may have independent and valid
business justifications." 577 F.2d at 915.
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One cannot resolve this question because the court determined that the
restraint could not be characterized as price-fixing and hence any state-
ment made concerning such restrictions was purely dictum. Neverthe-
less, the court's need to distinguish between price restraints and other
vertical restraints indicates a recognition of some difference. The dis-
tinction, however, may simply be that vertical price restraints may fit
into the category of restrictions that demonstrate a per se economic ef-
fect. Any interpretation of this decision or conclusions drawn from it
must reflect its ambiguities and difficulties in distinguishing between
vertical price and nonprice restraints and between vertical and horizon-
tal restraints.70
Other lower federal courts have had difficulty in analyzing and ap-
plying the Sylvania doctrine. In Pitchford Scientjfc Instruments Corp. v.
Pepi, Inc.71 a district court also misapprehended the holding of White
Motor72 and failed to properly interpret the Sylvania holding. In Pitch-
ford Judge Dumbauld initially recognized the problem that Sylvania
would cause in vertical price-fixing cases. After all, any argument
made in support of vertical territorial allocations could also be made in
justification of vertical price-fixing. 73 The court, however, proceeded to
determine that the case involved a horizontal agreement to divide terri-
tories and thus was not governed by Sylvania. In so holding, the court
aptly demonstrated the confusion' created by Sylvania by stating that
Sylvania dealt only with and was limited to location clauses.75 More
serious territorial restrictions were erroneously believed not to be cov-
ered by the decision.76
More complete and adequate guidance is obviously essential for an
70. See note 66 supra.
71. 435 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
72. The court improperly stated that the Sylvania decision "reverted to the standards of
"hite." Id. at 686. The Court actually went beyond White Motor to an acceptance of the rule of
reason standard for nonprice vertical restrictions. The district court, interestingly, did follow the
above-quoted remark with a statement appropriately describing White Motor as "where 'the
Court had refused to endorse a per se rule for vertical restrictions.'" Id.
73. Id. at 688 (citing Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion in 433 U.S. at 69 n.10 and Judge
Browning's dissenting opinion in 537 F.2d at 1019). See notes 45-57 supra and accompanying
text.
74. The court itself stated that "it is probable that the Continental T.V. [Sylvania] case will
produce as much confusion and controversy as the Schwinn case which it superseded." 435 F.
Supp. at 687.
75. Id. at 688.
76. See 433 U.S. at 51 n.18, 58 n.29. See also General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Win-
ery, 568 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978).
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orderly and principled approach to resale price maintenance. The Syl-
vania holding indicates one result, but its reasoning suggests an oppo-
site effect.
B. Horizontal Territorial Allocation
The Sylvania Court explicitly stated that its ruling did not extend to
horizontal territorial restraints and that the per se rule established in
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.77 remained fully intact.78 With
approximately equal zeal, legal commentators criticized the Court's re-
affrmation of Topco as economically incorrect and premised instead
on mere judicial convenience. 9
Attorney David Weisberg levels the most comprehensive assault on
Sylvania.8" He contends that the reasoning and logic of Sylvania
demand rejection of the Topco rationale. Weisberg attempts to sub-
stantiate this conclusion by reviewing Topco, its underpinnings, and re-
examining the validity of these supporting reasons in light of Sylvania.
Weisberg lays out and refutes three rationales that form the basis of the
Topco decision. First, horizontal territorial restraints interfere with ec-
onomic freedom."' Secondly, the overall economic impact of horizon-
77. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). In Topco a number of small and medium-sized grocers joined forces
to establish a private label chain of products in order to compete more effectively with the large
national grocery chains. To maintain an effective private label program, the annual sales must
exceed 250 million dollars and hence the need to bind together.
The district court, applying a rule of reason analysis, found the association to be pro-competi-
tive and therefore valid. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that horizontal territo-
rial allocations are per se illegal on the grounds that such restraints are classic examples of
unreasonable restraints of trade and that it is not for the courts, but for Congress, to balance
differing competitive forces, le., intrabrand competition against interbrand competition.
Chief Justice Burger filed a scathing dissent in which he contended that the majority errone-
ously employed a per se test without economic justification, misinterpreted judicial precedent, and
failed to properly employ the per se test. For strong praise of Justice Burger's dissent, see Han-
dler, supra note 3, at 986-87.
At this junction it would be appropriate to define interbrand and intrabrand competition. Inter-
brand competition is competition among sellers of the same general/generic product and in-
trabrand competition is that competition between distributors of the same branded product. See
433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
78. 433 U.S. at 57-58 nn.27-28. Note that the Court did not cite United States v. Scaly, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350 (1967), a case the Court heavily relied on in Topco and a decision rendered the same
day as Schwinn and authored by the same Justice-Fortas.
79. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 3, at 177; Handler, supra note 3, at 986-87; Posner, supra note
3, at 9-10; and Weisberg, supra note 3.
80. See Weisburg, supra note 3.
81. Id. at 1764-67. The Sylvania restriction imposes a greater restraint in that it is imposed
by another party but in Topco the restraint was self-imposed.
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tal territorial restraints cannot be evaluated. A court cannot balance
the increase in interbrand competition against the decrease in in-
trabrand competition.82 Third, horizontal territorial restraints have
historically been condemned, 3 Although Weisberg refutes each ra-
tionale, he fails to compare the anticompetitive effects of the horizontal
and the vertical territorial restrictions, perhaps because he was simply
arguing against the imposition of a per se rule of illegality against all
horizontal nonprice restraints.
8 4
Professor Posner asserts that the Court's ardent adoption of the
"free-rider" justification severely jeopardizes the validity of the Topco
line of reasoning.8" Professor Bork advocates legal recognition of an-
cillary86 horizontal territorial allocations unless the parties possess mar-
ket control.8 7
Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc."n (Sealy I1) is the most
significant horizontal territorial allocation case decided subsequent to
Sylvania8 9 In United States v. Sealpy (SealyI) a group of small mat-
82. Id. The economic balance performed in Sylvahia is equally applicable to horizontal re-
straints.
83. Id. Pre- Topco cases did not demand the Topco decision. Even if they did, Schwinn was
decided the same day as Topco's prime precedent-Seay.
84. Mr. Weisberg may not have been contending that all horizontal nonprice restraints come
under a rule of reason standard, but rather that they should not all be conclusively presumed to be
per se illegal.
85. Posner, supra note 3, at 10-1I. For an explanation of the free-rider justification, see notes
161-71 infra and accompanying text.
86. An ancillary restraint is one that is subordinate to the main purpose of the restriction.
The ancillary restraint doctrine provides that a restraint is reasonable if it is: (1) reasonably neces-
sary to accomplish the primary purposes; (2) not unreasonably anticompetitive; and (3) not im-
posed by a monopolist. Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 55 and cases cited therein.
Professor Bork distinguishes ancillary restraints from naked restraints by defining the latter as
"agreements eliminating competition which have no efficiency-creating potential" Bork, supra
note 46, at 384.
87. Bork, supra note 46, at 391-97. He contends that because the agreement cannot increase a
party's revenues by allowing output restriction, the only plausible explanation is manufacturing
efficiency. He has frequently contended that businessmen are in business to earn money. He
eliminates the possibility of increased profit from decreasing output by outlawing cartels that con-
trol market price. "A prerequisite for restriction of output is a large enough share of the market so
that the firm can alter total industry output significantly by changing its own output." Id. at 394.
88. 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
89. At the time of this second suit Scaly continued to license its trademark to various manu-
facturers who jointly owned over 98% of the Sealy stock. However, in the interim between Seal, I
and the present litigation Scaly acquired the rights to manufacture and sell in seven of its assigned
territories.
90. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
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tress manufacturers combined to form a common trademark (Sealy)
and product. The manufacturers licensed the product to themselves for
production and distribution. In holding the restraint to be a per se vio-
lation of the antitrust laws the Court noted that the case presented "an
aggregation of trade restraints" including unlawful resale price-fixing
activity.9' Following Sealy 1,92 the association, Sealy, Inc., attempted
to preserve the greatest degree of market division legally permissible
through a series of interrelated territorial restrictions. The devised sys-
tem consisted of location clauses, 93 areas of primary responsibility,94
profit pass-over clauses,95 exclusive territories,96 and right of first re-
fusal to purchase.97
The plaintiff in Sealy 11 (Ohio-Sealy) argued that the elaborate plan
maintained the illegal territorial allocation of Sealy I through more
subtle means.98 Ohio-Sealy contended that the diverse means em-
ployed by Sealy to divide territories, although arguably valid when
standing alone, are per se illegal when viewed in conjunction with each
91. Id. at 354.
92. The final decree in Sealy I provided that Sealy was prevented from entering into any
arrangement "to limit or restrict any manufacturer in any substantial way to sales of Sealy prod-
ucts within a prescribed territory." [1967] Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,327, at 84,856 (N.D. I11.).
The Chief of the Division's Midwest Office stated that the Division did not feel the language
prohibited the implementation of location clauses, areas of primary responsibility or profit pass-
over clauses. The validity of these methods would have to be determined in due course. 585 F.2d
at 826.
93. Licensees were permitted to manufacture Scaly products only from designated locations.
Location clauses were upheld by the Court in Sylvania;, Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517
F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975); Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
94. The Sealy licensing agreement provided that each licensee was responsible for its own
designated area and that once its designated quota was met royalties paid to Sealy would be cut in
half. Such agreements have traditionally been upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Colorado Pump &
Supply Co. v. Febco Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Kaiser v.
General Motors Corp., 396 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975), a f'd without opinion, 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir.
1976).
95. Sealy's profit pass-over clause contained two elements: (a) a 1% service charge to the
holder of the rights of the invaded territory as a compensatory fee for repairs and (b) a charge
based upon a formula to reimburse the invaded territory holder for promotional expenses. Such
claims have generally been upheld as reasonable restraints of trade. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270-71 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Superior Bedding Co. v.
Serta Assocs., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
96. Sealy agreed not to license anyone else in the businesses' designated areas.
97. This provision merely granted Scaly, Inc. the right of first refusal to purchase a selling
licensee's business at the contractually agreed on selling price between the licensee and its pro-
spective buyer.
98. 585 F.2d at 824, 826. But see Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 4.
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other.99 Mindful of the horizontal"° nature of the restraint, the court
recognized that any substantial limitation on a licensee's sales territory
was traditionally deemed a per se violation,' 0 ' unless, as defendant
contended, the Sylvania decision altered this general rule. The court
rejected the defendant's contention, however, and affirmed the trial
court's per se ruling.' 02 Judge Pell specifically relied on Sylvania's foot-
note 28, which "expressly reaffirmed the appropriateness of the per se
rule for horizontal territorial limits."'0 3 The Seal, II court refused to
balance the interbrand competitive effect against the intrabrand com-
petitive effect on the ground that Sylvania rejected this very argu-
ment.' ° "Limitations imposed by a single independent manufacturer
on its distributors" were considerably more suspect in the court's eyes
than "[a] horizontal agreement among potential competitors to develop
a national brand and not to compete with each other in selling it.' 0 5
Other federal courts have relied on the Sylvania decision in arriving
at the same conclusion. Courts continue to universally apply the per se
illegality doctrine to horizontal market division 0 6 unpersuaded by the
99. See notes 93-97 supra for judicial authority supporting the general nature of each of the
imposed restraints.
100. "It is indisputably clear that any restraints applied to the independent businesses which
are licensees result directly from the concerted action of their horizontal potential competitors."
585 F.2d at 827.
101. Id. (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)); Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). But see note 85 supra and
accompanying text (acknowledging that Sealy I involved an aggregation of restraints including
price-fixing, which the court explicitly recognized in note 4, 585 F.2d at 824 n.4, although specifi-
cally circumventing the problem by relying on the Topco decision).
102. The court held that although restrictions when standing alone may be innocent they lose
their validity when utilized in conjunction with additional restraints of trade. 585 F.2d at 827-28.
The court then proceeded to analyze each of the above-mentioned restrictions stating: (a) Loca-
tion clauses-due to the nature of the product and high transportation costs-such clauses tend to
forestall competition, especially if locations are carefully selected, as Sealy is alleged to have done;
(b) area of primary responsibility-was not discussed; (c) profit pass-over clauses-were found to
be unreasonable and unduly burdensome, the payment far exceeded the true cost; (d) right of first
refusal clause-was found to be employed only against the plaintiff and in order to protect the
defendant's licensees'; and (e) exclusive territories--see point (a) above.
103. 585 F.2d at 830 (referring to 433 U.S. at 58 n.28).
104. Id. at 831 (citing 433 U.S. at 57 n.27).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979) (dicta); United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978); Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C.
1977) (dicta); Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Pa.
1977); In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978).
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efforts of legal commentators. 0 7 One of these cases, however, further
raises the interesting question of the effect that the Sylvania ruling will
have on maximum vertical price restraints.0 8
C. Maximum Vertical Price Restrictions
Before Sylvania several legal commentators, including Professor Pos-
ner, asserted that Albrecht v. Herald Co. ,109 a decision that extended the
per se rule to agreements establishing maximum resale prices, was erro-
neous and economically unjustified. Sylvania, Posner contends, "de-
molish[ed] Albrecht."" A persuasive argument advanced in support
of this contention suggests that the manufacturer is powerless to pre-
vent a distributor from exploiting its exclusive territory without the
right to establish a maximum price. The justification for some territo-
rial market division mandates that a manufacturer be allowed to pre-
vent its distributors from extracting unfair and excessive profits from
their intrabrand monopoly.I" Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit in Al-
brecht adopted this precise argument."12 The Supreme Court rejected
this argument in Albrecht because it was unconvinced that allowing
one form of illegal restraint (price-fixing) would blunt the pernicious
consequences of another illegal activity (market division)."I3 The Syl-
vania ruling, however, places this argument in serious question and re-
kindles the position profferred by the Eighth Circuit.
The most significant post-Sylvania decision wrestling with this prob-
lem is Newberry v. Washington Post Co."I4 The Washington Post pro-
vided two channels for distribution of its newspaper-one set of dealers
provided home delivery while a second group of dealers provided serv-
107. See notes 79-87 supra and accompanying text.
108. See Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977).
109. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court, recognizing the differences between minimum price-
fixing and maximum price-fixing, found the restriction to be per se illegal because it: (1) Substi-
tuted the judgment of the manufacturer for that of the market and might hurt the distributor's
ability to perform point-of-sale services and to adequately compete; (2) aided market concentra-
tion; and (3) may actually serve as a minimum price.
110. See Posner, supra note 3, at 12. See also Handler, supra note 3, at 987; Pitofsky, supra
note 3, at 16 n.59; The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 241 (1977).
111. Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 16 n.59; The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70,
241 (1977).
112. 367 F.2d 517 (1966), rev'd, 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
113. 390 U.S. at 154 stating: "The assertion that illegal price fixing is justified because it
blunts the pernicious consequence of another distribution practice is unpersuasive."
114. 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977).
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ice to newstands, vending machines, and the like. The Post assigned
each home dealer a designated area, although their contracts did not
prohibit them from selling outside of their specified territory. In addi-
tion, the suggested price to home subscribers was included in each edi-
tion of the paper as well as in the recommended billing forms and
procedures given to its dealers. The dealers and the Post entered into
no agreement as to price. In the controversy that arose the plaintiffs
charged that the described distribution system illegally divided the
market as well as fixed the price.
The court held against the plaintiffs on the first claim because under
the applicable rule of reason test" 5 the vertical territorial allocation" 6
was justified because of its economic and administrative efficiencies."I7
The purpose of the restraint was to promote efficient, prompt service
with full market penetration; the territorial restraint accomplished
these purposes at a consistently reasonable price." 8
In discussing the claim that the Post prevented the distributor from
selling above the suggested price the court indicated that Sylvania un-
equivocally adhered to the proposition that any agreement or coercion
to establish price is per se illegal.'19 The court, however, in an ex-
tremely puzzling opinion circumvented this mandate by finding that
neither coercion, nor an express or implied agreement existed to estab-
lish the distributors' prices.'20 Rather than rule that a manufacturer
115. See 433 U.S. at 47-59.
116. See 438 F. Supp. at 474 n.5, ruling that the mechanism was vertically imposed because
"the scheme was initiated and orchestrated by the Post, and thus was vertical in effect as well as
appearance."
117. id. at 474-76.
118. Id. at 475. See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 226, 232 n.7 (N.D. Cal.
1979).
119. 438 F. Supp. at 479 (citing Syliania).
120. The court rejected the plaintiffs" contentions that there was an express agreement, implicit
agreement, and/or coercion. Concerning the first of these, the court found no evidence to support
the claim. Regarding the plaintiffs' economic theory of implied agreement, the court rejected this
on two grounds: (1) The Post maintained its price through legitimate, lawful means, and the Post
established economically viable prices that the distributors recognized, and (2) the distributors
were free to raise or lower prices as they desired, and the Post had never taken sanctions against
anyone-although it is not clear that anyone prior to Newberry ever challenged the Post, see notes
125-29 infra and accompanying text. Finally, the court held that there was no implicit coercion
and "[t]he suggestions that these staunch plaintiff dealers were afraid to act in their best independ-
ent interest is not worthy of belief." 438 F. Supp. at 476-80.
The Authors may be foolish but it is their belief that the Post would hold tremendous power
over these small, independent distributors and they would not likely challenge such power.
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has the right to minimize its distribution costs12' and prevent its distrib-
utors from exploiting their area of primary responsibility, the court re-
lied on a fictional absence of an express or implied agreement and the
lack of any coercion on the part of the Post. 122 Thus, the court, in es-
sence, relied on the questionable 123 holding of United States v. Colgate
& Co.12 4
In the one instance in which a distributor, Newberry, actually chal-
lenged the suggested price, 25 the Post retaliated by increasing its price
to Newberry by a sum equal to Newberry's price increase to its home
subscribers. 126 Under these facts the court found a violation of the an-
titrust laws based on the defendant's retaliatory action, which the court
believed removed the case from the Colgate reasoning. Therefore, the
Post forfeited its sheltered position because of its enforcement of its
suggested retail price. Apparently the court recognized the Colgate
doctrine in one breath and totally undercut its viability in another.
Newberry leaves a bare minimum of the Colgate doctrine: 27 A manu-
facturer may only establish a suggested retail price and refuse to deal
with those who do not obey the request. This reading of Newberry is
consistent with the conclusions of several commentators. 21
121. The court interestingly recognized this point when it stated:
There may well have been some concern in the minds of some dealers, including some
plaintiffs, that if a price increase by them resulted in appreciable loss of their circulation,
as it well might have, the Post would have a contract option to consider termination.
This, however, was not a threat but a business reality derived from factors inherent in the
business at hand.
Id. at 479.
122. Id. at 476-80.
123. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 459 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (2d ed.
1974); E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 273-77 (1976); L. SULLIVAN, SUpra note
27, at 392-95; Pitofsky & Dan, Is the Colgate Doctrine Dead?, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 772 (1968);
Posner, supra note 14, at 287-89.
Note that the Post switched from an independent distribution system to an agency system to
avoid the ill effects of the Ai4brecht decision.
124. In United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), the Supreme Court, bound to
follow the trial court's interpretation that the criminal indictment did not charge Colgate with an
unlawful agreement, merely held that the Sherman Act does not prohibit a manufacturer from
exercising freedom of choice with whom to deal.
125. Subsequent to the filing of the action two other distributors raised their prices and met
the same resistance that Newberry had met. 438 F. Supp. at 481 n.9.
126. Id. at 480-81.
127. This is precisely what commentators have alleged has occurred to the Colgate doctrine
and why they question its viability. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
128. See generally note 123 supra and authorities cited therein.
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Regardless of the viability of the Colgate doctrine, the Newberry de-
cision leaves significant questions by holding in favor of Newberry, but
against the distributors that alleged the Post coerced them to follow the
suggested retail price. Should the cause of action depend on one's will-
ingness to fight an extremely one-sided battle? More importantly,
should a manufacturer not be allowed to minimize its cost of distribu-
tion and prevent its distributors from exploiting the retail customer?
The Sylvania decision leaves the per se rule against maximum vertical
price restraints in serious doubt.
D. Boycotts and Concerted Refusals to Deal
The impact of Sylvania on concerted refusals to deal 29 can only be
determined after defining the scope of the restraint. Confusion has
long existed on whether the per se rule extended beyond horizontal
boycotts to vertical refusals to deal.'30 Traditionally, the bulk of the
evidence and logic rested with limiting the extent of the per se rule to
horizontal restraints.' 3 ' In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. '32
the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished a joint boycott from a single
manufacturer's refusal to deal or its establishment of an exclusive rela-
tionship with another.'33
The Sylvania decision lends further credence to the Klor's hold-
ing.134 Courts have interpreted Sylvania to hold that a rule of reason
129. The terms boycott and concerted refusals to deal are, as does the judiciary, used inter-
changeably herein despite the sound argument objecting to this. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 27,
at 231-32. The terms are qualified by recognizing that only some concerted refusals to deal, the
broader term, are per se illegal and others will be tested under a rule of reason analysis.
130. See generally Note, Vertical 4greements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck
Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92 HARV. L. REV. 1160 (1979).
131. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Byars v. Bluff
City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co.,
553 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1977); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). See also P. AREEDA, supra note 123, at 377; L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at § 91; Note, VerticalAgreements to Terminate Competing Distributors,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1160 (1979).
132. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
133. Id. at 212-13.
134. See, e.g., Daniels v. All Steel Equip., Inc., 590 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979); Gough v. Ross-
moor Corp., 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Oreck Corp. v. Whirl-
pool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). See generally Note,
Vertical Agreement to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92
HARV. L. REV. 1160 (1979).
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test should govern all' 35 nonprice vertical restraints, including con-
certed refusals to deal.'36 "[N]o vertical restrictions save price fixing
are per se illegal."'1 37 After all, a manufacturer may freely hire and
terminate its distributors for any legitimate business reason. The courts
continue to view horizontal refusals to deal as per se illegal.138
The primary distinction, therefore, is whether the concerted refusal
to deal is vertically or horizontally imposed. Is such a distinction ap-
propriate? One significant question is whether the distinction should
be based on a vertical/horizontal dichotomy or on unilaterality of ac-
tion. Two recent cases highlight this problem. The first of these two
decisions, Oreck Corp. v. Whir7pool Corp.,139 followed the verti-
cal/horizontal dichotomy while the second opinion, Cernuto, Inc. v.
United Cabinet Corp.,14° seemingly 14 adhered to the unilaterality of
action concept.
In Oreck Whirlpool Corporation manufactured vacuum cleaners
under both its own name and under the Kenmore name. 142 Oreck ex-
clusively distributed the vacuum cleaners sold under the Whirlpool
name. Sears, Roebuck & Co. exclusively distributed the Kenmore vac-
uum cleaners. Oreck alleged that its exclusive distributorship agree-
ment with Whirlpool was not renewed because of the existence of an
unlawful conspiracy between Whirlpool and Sears. 43 Oreck further
contended, and the trial court agreed, that a per se rule was applicable
because the agreement was intended to restrain price competition
and/or was a group boycott. 1" The Second Circuit, sitting en banc,
135. This is so unless a per se standard can be justified under economic scrutiny. 433 U.S. at
58-59.
136. See cases cited at note 134 supra. See also National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
137. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 387 n.9 (9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 440 U.S.
936 (1979) (citing National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979)).
138. See, eg., Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Gough v.
Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Oreck Corp.
v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); Evans-
ton Motor Co. v. Mid-Southern Toyota Distribs., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
139. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
140. 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
141. See notes 144-53 infr a and accompanying text for an explanation of the "seemingly"
qualification.
142. Kenmore is a trademark of Sears, Roebuck and Company.
143. 579 F.2d at 128.
144. Id. at 130.
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however, rejected both of these contentions, while primarily focusing
on the latter. 145
Judge Anderson, writing for the court, distinguished between vertical
and horizontal restraints and concluded that the restraint imposed by
Whirlpool was vertical. Therefore, the exclusive distributorship ar-
rangement was tested under a rule of reason analysis. The arrange-
ment was not a per se illegal group boycott of a horizontal nature.1 46
The court carefully distinguished United States v. General Motors
Corp . 147 on grounds that General Motors involved a price-fixing con-
spiracy.
The second case, Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 48 embodied
a similar factual situation. Cernuto alleged that one of its competitors,
Famous Furnace & Supply Co., and its supplier, United Cabinet Com-
pany, conspired to terminate Cernuto as a distributor of United to
protect Famous from Cernuto's price competition. Once again a termi-
nated distributor contended that voiding the relationship constituted a
per se violation of the antitrust laws and an illegal group boycott moti-
vated by an intent to restrain price competition. In initially reviewing
the appeal the court announced an incredible holding: "[U]nder the
circumstances present here the plaintiff may recover only if the chal-
lenged conduct is termed a per se violation of the Sherman Act, be-
cause under a 'rule of reason' analysis the necessary anti-competitive
effect as to a particular commodity in a relevant market cannot be
proven."' 49 The court's reasoning that a restraint can be considered
reasonable but nevertheless might be deemed per se illegal is extremely
perplexing. The Supreme Court recently has vigorously opposed such
reasoning: "There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust
145. In so doing, the court affirmed the earlier panel decision also written by Judge Anderson.
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1977), a'don rehearing, 579 F.2d 126 (2d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). Moreover, concerning the price-fixing allega-
tion, which never reached the jury, the court found that there was no evidence presented support-
ing the contention that Oreck's termination was to maintain the price structure. Oreck had total
freedom to establish its own price and, in fact, was underpriced by Sears. 579 F.2d at 131.
146. 579 F.2d at 132. The court did, however, note that this case differed from the traditional
termination of an exclusive dealer in that Whirlpool did not replace Oreck with another distribu-
tor. The court resolved the controversy in Whirlpool's favor since there was no anticompetitive
effect on the market. Id. at 133-34.
147. 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (a group of General Motors (G.M.) dealers combined to attempt to
prevent G.M. from selling to discount sellers).
148. 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
149. Id. at 165.
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analysis. In the first category are agreements whose nature and neces-
sary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish their illegality-they are 'illegal per
se." ,150 Per se rules are designed to prohibit conduct "that is clearly
anticompetitive."t 51
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defend-
ants Judge Adams carefully distinguished the general judicial tolerance
for unilateral decisions made by a manufacturer in organizing its distri-
bution system 52 from the Cernuto fact pattern. The court contrasted
Cernuto with the Sylvania decision and other unilateral cases on two
grounds: One, the horizontal nature of the Cernuto case; and two, the
impact of the restraint on price maintenance. 5 3 The Cernuto court
viewed the controversy as horizontal in nature because of the impact
and coercion on another retail customer and apparently rejected the
Oreck line of analysis.154 Judge Adams considered the alleged conspir-
atorial effect on price equally important in distinguishing the distribu-
tor termination from acceptable manufacturer practices.
At this juncture of the opinion the nature and extent of its holding
and the significance of the interplay between the horizontal and price
maintenance elements become extremely puzzling. 55 The court first
indicated that it might not have reached the same result in Oreck, but
proceeded to demonstrate that Oreck differed in that Whirlpool was
not motivated by a desire to fix prices.'5 6 More importantly, the court's
150. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). But see
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 605 F.2d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'dper cur/am, 100 S.
Ct. 1925 (1980) (competing wholesalers' agreement that required retailers to pay cash on delivery
found per se illegal price-fixing).
151. Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 12 (emphasis added). Moreover, Pitofsky goes on to modify this
standard: "Considerable experience has revealed that such conduct almost always results in ad-
verse competitive effects, and almost never is justified by business reasons sufficiently persuasive to
counteract those adverse effects." Id. (emphasis in original).
Mr. Justice Powell, the author of the majority's opinion in Sylvania, on the other hand, was
especially demanding of a factual showing of "unmistakable evils of an arrangement in the actual
operation" before it would be declared per se illegal. Handler, supra note 3, at 983.
152. Sylvania, it was believed, was consistent with this line ofjudicial tolerance (favoring uni-
lateral decisions of a manufacturer). 595 F.2d at 167.
153. Id. at 167-70.
154. The court reasoned that the decision to refuse to deal with Cernuto was not freely taken
by Famous, the manufacturer, but was in fact precipitated by Cernuto's competitor, United.
Thus, the court held that the restraint was primarily horizontal in nature. Id. at 167-68. See note
146 supra and accompanying text.
155. 595 F.2d at 169-70.
156. Id. at 170. The court also distinguished Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car
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ultimate holding interconnects the horizontal and price maintenance
grounds:
Thus, despite Packard and Oreck, the situation present in this case may
be fairly considered to raise the possibility of a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. Given the alleged anticompetitive and arguably horizontal
impact of United's decision, and given the price orientation of the alleged
conspiracy, we cannot say that a per se violation of the Act may not be
shown. If Cernuto can prove at trial that United, Lappin and Famous
conspired to protect Famous from price competition by Cernuto, and that
United and Lappin terminated Cemuto at Famous' request and in pursuit
of a price related end, then it can prevail on a price-fixing theory notwith-
standing its failure to show any impact on- competition involving kitchen
cabinet sales in Western Pennsylvania .... [I]f defendants can demon-
strate that their actions were not motivated solely by consideration of
price then the use of a per se rule might be inappropriate.
5 7
One cannot be sure whether Cernuto actually abandoned the tradi-
tional definition of group boycotts or simply relied on illegality of
price-fixing. Nevertheless, Judge Adams clearly indicated that he is not
adverse to the idea of expanding the per se illegality of group boycotts
to vertical restraints.
The impact of Sylvania on the area of boycotts primarily depends on
the definition of the restraint. If the traditional concept is not followed,
i e., one includes vertical, non-unilateral agreements, then Sylvania ob-
viously is relevant. On the other hand, if the traditional definition of
boycotts is appropriate, then Sylvania's influence must be limited to
analogy and comparison.
III. TOWARD A PRINCIPLED APPROACH
The lesson is clear. The antitrust laws, which are designed to pro-
mote competition and the free market system,158 must pay deference to
economic analysis and reality. The problem, however, is how to best
accomplish these goals. Which approach and whose analysis is most
Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957), on the grounds that it involved a
failing company as well as a mere attempt to obtain an exclusive distributorship. Packard Motor
did not involve price-fixing. 595 F.2d at 169.
157. 595 F.2d at 170 (emphasis added).
158. See generally P. AREEDA, supra note 123; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 27; H. THORELLI, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955); Gelhorn, The New Gibberish at the FTC, REG., May/June
1978, at 37.
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satisfactory? Sylvania preaches the merit of economic analysis, 59 but
fails to conduct a thorough and insightful investigation. There is a
drastic need for comprehensive analysis and research to predict more
adequately the effect of various restraints on the free market system.
A. A Re-examination of Sylvania
The "impressive" economic analysis160 undertaken in the Sylvania
opinion focused principally on the "free-rider" concept. 16' The
Court's 62 other justifications presented sound, but neither novel nor
overwhelming, support for its decision to apply a rule of reason stan-
dard to all vertical nonprice restrictions. 163 Both pre- and post-Sylva-
nia commentators have strenuously debated this issue. 164 The most
amazing result is the prominent division of opinion-Professors Bork
and Posner on one side and Professors Sullivan, Areeda, and Pitofsky
on the other side. 16- Clearly, economic analysis does not lead one to an
inevitable conclusion.
The logical starting point for analyzing and understanding this quag-
mire lies with the economic argument underlying the Sylvania decision:
A manufacturer will strive to obtain a high volume, low mark-up distri-
159. 433 U.S. at 59.
160. See generally Bork, supra note 3 (sophisticated analysis of economic efficiencies); Posner,
supra note 3.
161. See notes 43 supra and 166-71 infra and accompanying text.
162. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
163. Other courts had previously recognized that special consideration should be given to new
entrants and failing companies. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn and Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967);
Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'dpercuriam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Moreover, the product safety and
quality justification has been advanced in Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970) and In re Adolph Coors Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) [Transfer
Binder 1973-1976], at 20,403 (F.T.C. 1973), aj'd, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975). Both present well reasoned, but limited justifications.
Note that both the Sylvania Court and Professor Posner believe that some vertical restraints
may be proven to be unreasonable and, according to Sylvania, possibly even shown to be per se
illegal, but Professor Bork believes all vertical restraints are per se legal.
164. See note 165 infra.
165. See Bork, supra note 3; Bork, supra note 46, at 465-73; Posner, supra note 3; Posner,
supra note 14, at 283-85. But see P. AREEDA, supra note 123, at § 503; L. SULLIVAN, supra note
27, at § 145; Pitofsky, supra note 3. Professor Posner, moreover, has recognized this deep rooted
dispute: "Not all economists and lawyers knowledgeable in economics who write on monopoly
questions, perhaps not even most, view restricted distribution so benignly." Posner, supra note 3,
at 5.
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bution system.1 66 A manufacturer arguably only will impose restric-
tions on product distribution if restrictions will increase distributive
efficiency. A manufacturer will attempt to minimize distribution costs
in order to increase sales revenues and profits. 1
67
This fundamental principle forms the basis of the "free-rider" con-
cept. A manufacturer may desire to restrict competition among its
dealers "to increase the amount of nonprice competition among his
dealers in order to stimulate the provision of point-of-sale services in
the distribution of his product."' 68 If the consumer prefers the addi-
tional services at a passed-on cost, the manufacturer gains distributive
efficiency, thereby promoting interbrand market position. Further-
more, competition in becoming an exclusive distributor will force dis-
tributors to expend excess profits from the curtailed interbrand
competition on the desired nonprice point-of-sale services.
169
Without implementation of market division, or resale price mainte-
nance, 17 advocates of this theory maintain that market imperfections
will prevent distributors from providing these economically efficient
point-of-sale services. A distributor will not furnish these types of serv-
ices, (e.g., skilled sales personnel, large inventories, service facilities,
advertisements), if free-riders who do not provide such services would
underprice the distributor. The cost to the provider of such services
will exceed those of sellers who avoid service expenses. The free-rider
allegedly will prevent the manufacturer from obtaining the economi-
cally efficient and optimal amount of point-of-sale services. No distrib-
utor will provide such services even though the manufacturer receives
an overall benefit.
Closely related, if not part of the free-rider rationale, is the argument
that territorial allocation will prevent intrabrand competitors from
166. See Bork, supra note 46, at 402-03; Posner, supra note 14, at 283-84; Pitofsky, supra note
3. at 10.
167. Posner, supra note 14, at 283. See also Bork, supra note 46, at 402-03 ("The manufac-
turer would never impose a limitation upon competition among its resellers which had the effect
of restricting output further, for that would decrease the manufacturer's net revenue."). Areeda
states that any "'[excessive' dealer profit resembles a 'tax' on the product." P. AREEDA, supra
note 123, at § 502. But see id at § 503.
168. P. AREEDA, supra note 123, at § 503.
169. Id. See Bork, supra note 46, at 446-49; Posner, supra note 3, at 4.
170. See notes 192-201 infra and accompanying text. As noted at note 189 infra, the "free-
rider" concept was initially utilized to justify resale price maintenance. See Bork, supra note 46,
at 453-54.
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"skimming the cream."' 7' The argument is that competitors will in-
vade another's territory and underprice the local distributor who spent
considerable sums of money establishing readily identifiable and com-
mitted customers.' 72  The invader will reap the harvest of another's
hard work. More significantly, once a distributor loses these easy, prof-
itable sales, it will be unable to rebound in low profit sales and there-
fore will deny the manufacturer deeper market penetration. 173
Several other justifications have been offered in support of the con-
tention that vertical restrictions will increase interbrand competition. 74
The redeeming virtue of these restraints, however, is their ability to
facilitate point-of-sale services and deep market penetration. The re-
maining justifications-the attraction of quality distributors and capital
to new or failing entrants,175 the promotion of health and safety, 176 and
the avoidance of duplicative and inefficient services 177 are either inva-
lid or simply devoid of support.17 8
Are these redeeming virtues sufficient to justify all vertical nonprice
restraints? 179 Or, does Sylvania, like Schwinn, go overboard in its ulti-
171. See In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978) (appeal pending); P. AREEDA, supra note
123, at § 517; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at § 145; Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 4, 41, 67.
Significantly, all of these authorities with the exception of the neutral Monograph are not strong
supporters of vertical restraints.
Concerning the term "skimming the cream," see note 172 infra. For a rebuttal of this justifica-
tion see note 201 infra.
172. Hence, the close connection to the free-rider concept. Moreover, the expression "cream
skimming" derives from the fact that these customers have already been established and are easily
sold with a limited amount of effort and expense.
173. See note 171 supra and note 201 infra and accompanying text. See also P. KOTLER,
PRINCIPLES OF MARKETING 66-92, 422-43 (1980).
174. See notes 175-78 infra and accompanying text for a compilation of these justifications.
175. See note 163 supra and accompanying text.
176. Id.
177. See In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978) (appeal pending); Monograph No. 2, supra
note 6, at 41; Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 25; notes 114-18 supra and accompanying text.
178. Interestingly, most of these justifications have been put forth by the opponents, not the
proponents, of vertical territorial allocations. These virtues have included the following: (a) The
obtainment of economies of scale, see P. AREEDA, supra note 123, at § 517; L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 27, at § 145; Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 25-26; (b) the historical success of such restraints, see P.
AREEDA, supra note 123, at § 517; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at § 145; (c) dealer good-will
through high dealer profit, see P. AREEDA, supra note 123, at § 517; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at
§ 145; (d) the maintenance of geographic price discrimination, see Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph
Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 942 n.5 (5th Cir. 1975); P. AREEDA, supra note 123, at § 525; Comanor,
supra note 37.
179. See note 163 supra.
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mate conclusion? 8 ° The point-of-sale/free-rider justification raises
several significant issues. First, if business individuals' 81 and segments
of society are critical of interfering with the workings of the market-
place, whether by government or otherwise, how can they propose the
allowance of a managed market? Why not let the market determine
what is economically efficient and desirable? 8 2 Is it not a misalloca-
tion of resources, 181 as well as contrary to the goals of antitrust law, for
a mechanism other than the marketplace to determine the consumers'
needs? If purchasers desire such services, the market should reveal that
inclination, unless this is a situation in which the market cannot prop-
erly perform due to certain imperfections. Will the consumer actually
purchase a good after receiving the desired point-of-sale services from
the provider or will he furtively patronize the neighboring discounter?
The consumer inherently finds himself in the "double bind."' 84 He will
regret not purchasing from the provider of these important services, but
bemoan the decision to pay a greater price. Some argue the irrelevancy
of this discussion because the market still can make the decision
through the manufacturer and the manufacturer's desire for economic
efficiency. 8" Nevertheless, further detailed and comprehensive re-
search is needed to answer this question.
Regardless of whether the market could, or should, properly handle
the free-rider problem, one must determine the benefit gained from al-
lowance of such restrictions. Are the restrictions obviously economi-
cally beneficial? The Federal Trade Commission observed that a
manufacturer, by granting exclusive territories, may be preventing dis-
tributor free-riding at the expense of permitting the distributor to take a
free-ride on the consumer. 8 6 The consumer "may end up paying for
180. See generally Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 2.
181. An extremely commonplace occurrence within the corridors and offices of corporate
America is the severe condemnation of government and society for its interference with the free
market system. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); L. SILK & D.
VOGEL, ETHICS AND PROFITS (1976).
182. See P. AREEDA, supra note 123, at § 517; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at § 145; Comanor,
supra note 37, at 1433; Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 23.
183. Professor Bork has already recorded his objection to such reasoning: "mhe manufac-
turer will employ vertical restraints, only if consumers respond more to the information provided
than they would to lower prices without the information." Bork, supra note 3, at 181.
184. Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, SCIENCE 1243 (Dec. 1968).
185. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 3, at 181.
186. See In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 630 n.33 (1978) (appeal pending). But see
Comanor, supra note 37, at 1433; Pitofsky, juapra note 3, at 20-23.
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any excessive advertising, merchandising, or local sales efforts which
would be discouraged in favor of price competition."'
'1 7
Proponents of the free-rider concept contend that any profit above
the competitive level would be channeled back into point-of-sale serv-
ices to prevent the manufacturer from terminating the distributor's ex-
clusive territory.'88 Therefore, the manufacturer will be able to
regulate the level of point-of-sale services through assignment of speci-
fied market areas. 189 Moreover, the manufacturer will compare cost
efficiency of added services against consumer reaction to decreased
prices, 19 thus preventing consumers from paying for services that they
do not desire.
But will a distributor automatically reinvest all of its monopoly prof-
its into nonprice competitive services? Will a manufacturer only com-
pare consumer reaction to additional information against consumer
reaction to a price decrease? Alternatively, will the manufacturer also
look to promotion of dealer goodwill and contentment? Economic
logic suggests that the distributor, at a minimum, will utilize portions of
additional revenue as a reasonable return for his extra expenditures
and services.' 9' More importantly, human nature reveals that the dis-
tributor will attempt to retain as much of the monopoly profit as possi-
ble. The question therefore focuses on the manufacturer's motivation
in limiting this desire. Will it generally be in the manufacturer's best
interest to force its distributors to reinvest all of their excess profits?
Or, are there equally commanding, if not compelling, reasons for al-
lowing the distributor to reap some monopoly profit? The answer, of
course, lies in whether the manufacturer will receive sufficient benefit
to outweigh the added cost of distribution.
Unlike avid proponents of the permissibility of vertical restraints, the
Authors believe that a cost/benefit analysis demonstrates that under
187. In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 603 n.33 (1978).
188. Bork, supra note 46, at 430-38; Posner, supra note 3, at 4-5; Posner, supra note 14, at 284-
85 ("Competition to become an exclusive dealer will assure that dealers do not exploit their mo-
nopoly to the detriment of the manufacturer.").
189. This argument was principally used with, and is better suited for use with, resale price
maintenance. The argument is that a manufacturer can specifically determine the amount of
point-of-sale services by establishing the resale price. The distributor will continue spending suffi-
cient sums of money on nonprice competition "until the marginal cost of distribution has risen to
meet the resale price." Posner, supra note 14, at 284.
190. Bork, supra note 3, at 181.
191. C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS (7th ed. 1978).
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certain conditions, though not in all, allowance of high dealer profit
will result in a long term benefit to the manufacturer. Initially, one
should recognize that the manufacturer, by allowing high dealer profit,
may enhance its interbrand competitive position by creating dealer
goodwill and encouraging dealer sales efforts. In other words, the man-
ufacturer might be willing to motivate the dealer into favoring its prod-
uct over those of its competitors. 92 Moreover, the cost to attract these
aggressive, loyal, and competent distributors may be minimal. If the
cross-elasticity of the manufacturer's goods is low, then the consumer,
and not the manufacturer, will compensate the dealer for additional
services and profits. 193 Proponents, however, probably would counter
this contention by asserting that the manufacturer is indirectly subsi-
dizing the distributor's profit by forfeiting its own interest. A proper
analysis, therefore, must supply a rationale for manufacturer allegiance
to such "irrational" conduct. The underlying justification varies with
the manufacturer's market position.
The manufacturer appears foolish in forfeiting any marginal revenue
if it possesses significant market power."' By its very position, the
manufacturer does not face any strong interbrand competition and is
not threatened by the ready loss of customers (low cross-elasticity). 95
Therefore, the manufacturer possesses a levered position in dealing
with its distributors who will be hard pressed to obtain additional prof-
its from the manufacturer. On the other hand, a conservative manufac-
turer, which is a common sight in today's market place,196 might very
well elect to please its established distributors. After all, the manufac-
turer obtained its present dominant position through the support of
such distributors. Why should the manufacturer "rock the boat"?
By maximizing distributor goodwill and earning a handsome profit,
192. P. AREEDA, supra note 123, at §§ 514, 523.
193. Comanor, supra note 37, at 1430. See also Mr. Donald Turner's argument as presented
in Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 38.
194. This term is used to indicate that the manufacturer, and it alone, has the power to control
price in the relevant market. Hence, the importance of both market share and product differentia-
tion. See generally Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 60-67.
195. Unlike the Court in United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956),
cross-elasticity cannot simply be determined by examining the decrease in demand due to further
price increases. See E. GELHORN, hupra note 123, at 120-25; Stocking & Muller, The Cellophane
Case and the New Competition, 45 AM. ECON. REv. 29, 57-62 (1955).
196. Big business today is more concerned with steady growth and financially secure invest-
ments than they are with rapid and spectacular, although risky, adventures. J.K. GALBRAITH,
ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973).
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the manufacturer could secure its market position by increasing entry
barriers. An established distributor would be unwilling to push a com-
peting product fearing that it would offend the dominant company and
jeopardize its own high profit. Then, those that desire to enter the mar-
ket would have to vertically integrate or develop new distributors.
Both vertical integration and development of new distributors require
large additional capital outlays. The manufacturer, therefore, might
logically elect to protect its long run market position at the expense of
some negligible short run return. At the same time the manufacturer
will eliminate potential competition and/or avoid establishing new, un-
proven distributors or jeopardizing capital on a vertically integrated
distribution system. Economic analysis cannot be pursued in a vac-
uum; one must consider business and social psychology as well as long
run market position.
The willingness of established, but nondominant, companies to
foresake additional revenues also can be explained by their desire to
enhance market position and long run revenues. Because suppliers
function in a competitive environment, a supplier might "bribe" its dis-
tributors into favoring its product. With the manufacturer's assistance,
loyal and motivated distributors may successfully convince consumers
of the uniqueness and desirability of a basically fungible product-
product differentiation. By establishing its own market the manufac-
turer and its distributors could conceivably increase profitability at the
consumer's expense.
Frequently point-of-sale services are unnecessary and the "free-
rider" problem does not actually exist. Many products do not require
that dealers provide elaborate showrooms, sophisticated sales person-
nel, or complete repair facilities. Often there are reasonable and less
restrictive alternatives. 197 It seems odd that the limited free-rider justi-
fication should be the primary reason for validating all vertical non-
price restraints. Why do manufacturers not confronted with the free-
197. See Pitofsky, supra note 3; The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 235-36
(1977). For instance, if the manufacturer desires point-of-sale repair facilities why cannot it pro-
vide the service or reimburse the dealer for such service? If local advertising is desired the manu-
facturer can either do it itself or mandate that all distributors spend $X or Y% on advertisements.
Moreover, clauses and areas of primary responsibility frequently adequately meet the mianufac-
turer's needs.
Regarding the least restrictive alternative in general, see American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1248-49 (3d Cir. 1975); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506
F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975); Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 58-60; Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 33-34.
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rider problem use territorial market division? What justifications do
they have? "[I]f the restraint is shown to be excessive for the manufac-
turer's needs, then its presence invites suspicion ..... 198
What alternatives exist for suppliers who do not elect to appease
their distributors? What risks are they voluntarily encountering? Will
they be able, financially or otherwise, to vertically integrate or replace
their present distributors with equally competent dealers? 199 How will
such a reorganization affect their image and clientele? Will their cus-
tomers remain loyal to their product or to their old distributors? Or, if
the distributors remain with the manufacturer, will they be equally
loyal and aggressive?
Is the above-mentioned analysis limited to single brand distributors
or is it also applicable to multibrand distributors? Regarding the latter,
will not the originating manufacturer's competitors probably meet the
price challenge with a similar ante of their own? The question remains
whether they will respond timely to the challenge-or will the distribu-
tors and/or the consuming public already be swayed toward the prod-
uct. Competition and market advancement demand risk taking and
competitive aggressiveness. Finally, a manufacturer might impose ver-
tical nonprice restrictions due to coercion from a retail cartel. Such
conduct does pose a real concern despite its illegality."
Legitimate201 and illegitimate reasons exist, therefore, for imposition
of vertical market restraints. Before suggesting an appropriate ap-
proach for handling this quandry, one must determine whether all ver-
tical restraints should be treated equally. Do location clauses, areas of
primary responsibility, and the like have the same competitive effect
and impact as airtight territorial restrictions? The majority in Sylvania
answered this question in the affirmative, but Mr. Justice White and the
Ninth Circuit distinguished these types of restraints.2"2 The Authors
198. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270 n.9 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
199. A manufacturer must determine whether it can directly or indirectly raise the capital and
whether the new distributors will be as economically and politically efficient.
200. See, e.g., 433 U.S. at 58 n.28; Bork, supra note 46, at 405; Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 26-27.
201. The "cream skimming" justification has clearly and properly been demonstrated to be
invalid. Professor Areeda suggests that this invidious sounding conduct can only mean that a
distributor is merely being denied supra-profits by the existence of intrabrand competition. What
is "cream," but low cost or high profit sales, ie., monopoly profit, that intrabrand competition
might eliminate. P. AREEDA, supra note 123, at § 517; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at § 145.
202. The restraints were believed to be clearly less anticompetitive. See generally Pitofsky,
supra note 3; Robinson, supra note 13, at 277. Schwinn was also distinguished on the contrasting
market power between the two companies-Schwinn's large and Sylvania's small.
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agree with Mr. Justice White and the Ninth Circuit. Restraints that
limit intrabrand competition cannot be equated with restraints that to-
tally eliminate competition. In its haste to overrule the Schwinn prece-
dent the Sylvania Court ignored economic realities.20 3 A curtailment of
all intrabrand competition cannot always have the same effect as a less
rigorous limitation on intrabrand competition. For instance, a dealer
will generally be in a superior bargaining position if it can purchase its
cola soft drink supply from several suppliers rather than only one. This
is true even though the dealer must travel greater distances to pick up
its orders from other suppliers.2" Of course, the seemingly more mod-
erate restraints can be equally anticompetitive depending on the actual
restriction employed. In the above example, the alternative locations
can be spaced so far apart as to negate their viability.20 5 Despite the
handicap, the intrabrand competition might provide sufficient competi-
tive pressure to moderate the behavior of the local supplier, especially
where interbrand competition is negligible.20 6
In light of the concepts discussed above, the Authors suggest that
courts adhere to the following guidelines pertaining to nonprice vertical
restraints:
(1) All airtight vertical territorial restrictions imposed by a supplier
that dominates over fifty percent of the market should be declared per
se illegal.
(2) All less restrictive vertical territorial restraints imposed by a
dominant firm should be carefuly scrutinized under a presumption of
illegality.
(3) All airtight vertical territorial restrictions imposed by a manufac-
turer without market power2 "7 should be carefuly scrutinized under a
rule of reason2°8 analysis, with special emphasis on whether a less re-
203. Recall that the final decree in Schwinn permitted the use of location clauses.
204. In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978) (appeal pending). Although the example used
herein is a location clause, the analysis equally applies to areas of primary responsibility and profit
pass-over clauses.
205. See Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cerl. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
206. See In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978) (appeal pending).
207. The lesser the power the greater the restraint's chance of survival. See generally Mono-
graph No. 2, supra note 6, at 63-64.
208. In employing the rule of reason analysis a court should consider the limited justifications
already discussed, health and safety, and the avoidance of duplicative and costly services. See
notes 176-77 supra and accompanying text.
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strictive alternative would suffice2"9 and on market structure.21 "
(4) All less restrictive vertical territorial restraints imposed by non-
dominant companies are to be judged according to a rule of reason
analysis which includes consideration of market structure with a pre-
sumption of legality for any firm with less than ten percent of the mar-
ket.
(5) All vertically imposed nonprice restraints employed by a new en-
trant or failing company should be rebuttably presumed to be legal.2 '
B. Guidelinesfor Various Other Market Restrictions
1. Resale Price Maintenance
The arguments against declaring all vertical nonprice restraints legal
or falling under a rule of reason analysis apply with greater force to
resale price maintenance agreements. 21 2 The Supreme Court recently
acknowledged that "[plrice is the 'central nervous system of the econ-
omy,' and an agreement that 'interfere[s] with the setting of price by
free market forces' is illegal on its face."213 Moreover, considering that
209. The less restrictive alternative is not generally proposed because it is desired to avoid
second guessing business judgments. See American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521
F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975); M. HANDLER, supra note 14,.at 707. By providing airtight restraints,
however, business individuals are put on notice as to their questionable validity and can act ac-
cordingly.
210. The greater the likelihood of oligopolistic pricing, the greater is the need for intrabrand
competition. A court should be careful to assess the market structure to properly predict the effect
of any market restriction. When dealing with oligopolies, which generally avoid price competi-
tion, one must recognize the great interdependence of these firms and hence their conservative
competitive policies. See P. AREEDA, supra note 123; E. GELHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS (1972); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (1973); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 27.
Conduct which might be acceptable in a competitive market might be unreasonable in an oligo-
polistic situation. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). Frequently
an oligopolistic market will produce restricted output and increased prices without any formal
agreement; the firms will recognize their interdependence and act as monopolists. The courts
must carefully scrutinize prices and nonprice leadership.
The more likely one will be faced with an oligopolistic pricing structure the greater the need for
intrabrand competition. Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 63-64; Comanor, supra note 37, at
1436-39.
211. See, ag., Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 68-69; Comanor, supra note 37, at 1437-38;
Posner, supra note 14, at 293. For the other limited justifications previously discussed, see note
208 supra.
212. Bork, 5pra note 3, at 176-77; Posner, supra note 14, at 292-95.
213. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (quoted
in Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979)).
Despite this contention it is recognized that territorial restrictions might have a greater anticom-
petitive effect than price-fixing agreements because with the former there might not be any need to
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oligopolies (any four firms with sixty percent or more of the market)
theoretically refrain from price competition, 21 4 allowance of resale
price maintenance will tremendously affect such markets. As already
indicated,z1 5 the more likely one is faced with the lack of interbrand
price competition, the greater the need for intrabrand price competi-
tion.
Therefore, the Authors propose that any manufacturer that possesses
market power or competes in an oligopolistic market and is one of the
oligopolistic companies should be per se prohibited from establishing
resale price maintenance. All other cases should be analyzed under a
rule of reason analysis, with a presumption of legality in favor of fail-
ing companies, new entrants, and those with a diminutive market
share.
2. Horizontal Territorial Allocation
The Authors propose that the present per se rule continue, with an
exception for small competitors who jointly organize to more compe-
tently compete with their larger competitors. An example is the
Topco arrangement.21 6 This exemption, however, should not pertain to
combinations in which the resulting organization possesses market
dominance. In these situations, the presently imposed per se illegality
rule should remain in effect. Under this newly proposed rule of reason
exception courts should carefully scrutinize the necessity for territorial
allocation and should only permit an airtight arrangement when less
restrictive means are unavailable. Additionally, courts should carefully
analyze relevant market structure.
3. Vertical Maximum Resale Price
A distributor should not be automatically in violation of the antitrust
laws by merely attempting to minimize its cost of distribution and
preventing its distributors from exploiting their market position. The
compete on price or nonprice terms, depending on the consumer's mobility. See St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 553 n.25 (1978); P. AREEDA, supra note 123, at § 516; L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 224-25; Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 44; Posner, supra note 14,
at 292.
214. See note 210 supra and accompanying text.
215. Id.
216. See Posner, supra note 3, at 9-10. Professor Posner, supra note 14, at 298-99, stretches
this test beyond the guidelines proposed herein by stating that all horizontal territorial allocations
should be per se legal if they result in less than two-thirds control of the market.
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per se rule, as applied to vertical maximum pricing, was never justi-
fied 2t 7 and now, in light of Sylvania, is absurd. Once again, the appro-
priate standard should be reasonableness and not a label.2" 8
4. Boycotts and Concerted Refusals to Deal
The traditional rule that horizontal agreements to boycott or refusals
to deal are per se illegal, with its numerous exceptions, should remain
intact. Vertical termination agreements of distributors also should con-
tinue to be judged under a rule of reason analysis. Greater emphasis,
however, should be placed on market power and structure in applying
the rule of reason. For instance, in Oreck the court should have care-
fully scrutinized Sears' involvement in Whirlpool's termination of
Oreck and should not have hesitated to find an illegal restraint of trade
if Sears did actively assert its influence."u 9
217. See, e.g., Monograph No. 2, supra note 6, at 85-87; Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 32-33; Pos-
ner, supra note 14, at 290-92; Posner, supra note 3, at 12.
218. The Authors reserve comment on horizontally imposed maximum price-fixing, e.g.,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
219. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Golden Gate Acceptance
Corp. v. General Motors, 597 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1979).
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